Abstract-Noisy channels are a powerful resource for cryptography as they can be used to obtain information-theoretic secure key agreement, commitment, and oblivious transfer protocols, among others. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive, since it is complete for secure multi-party computation, and the OT capacity characterizes how efficiently a channel can be used for obtaining string oblivious transfer. Ahlswede and Csiszár (ISIT'07) presented upper and lower bounds on the OT capacity of generalized erasure channels (GECs) against passive adversaries. In the case of GEC with erasure probability at least 1/2, the upper and lower bounds match and, therefore, the OT capacity was determined. It was later proved by Pinto et al. [IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 57(8)] that the OT capacity is identical for passive and malicious adversaries. In the case of GEC with erasure probability smaller than 1/2, the known lower bound against passive adversaries that was established by Ahlswede and Csiszár does not match their upper bound and it was unknown whether this OT rate could be achieved against malicious adversaries as well. In this paper, we show that there is a protocol against malicious adversaries achieving the same OT rate that was obtained against passive adversaries. We obtain our results by a new combination of interactive hashing and typicality tests that are suitable for dealing with the case of low erasure probability ( p * < 1/2).
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE usefulness of noisy channels for cryptographic purposes was first realized by Wyner [39] , who proposed a secret key agreement protocol based on noisy channels. Later on it was showed by Crépeau and Kilian that such channels can also be used to obtain information-theoretically secure implementations of cryptographic primitives such as oblivious transfer and commitment protocols [11] , [12] .
Oblivious transfer (OT) is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives since it is complete for two-party and multi-party computation [15] , [23] , [28] , i.e., given an implementation of OT it is possible to securely evaluate any polynomial time computable function without any additional assumptions. In the early years of research on OT, different variants of OT were proposed [34] , [38] , but it was later showed that they are equivalent [10] . Thereafter the community has focused mainly on the one-out-of-two string oblivious transfer variant, which is the one considered in this work. It is a primitive involving two parts, Alice and Bob. Alice inputs two strings S 0 , S 1 ∈ {0, 1} k and Bob inputs a choice bit c. Bob receives as output S c . Informally, the security of the OT protocol guarantees that (a dishonest) Alice cannot learn c, while (a dishonest) Bob cannot learn information on both strings. The results of Crépeau [11] and Crépeau and Kilian [12] regarding OT based on noisy channels were later improved in [13] , [29] , [30] , and [37] .
A. OT Capacity
After the initial success in obtaining OT protocols from noisy channels, researchers started to investigate the question of which channels can be used to implement OT and how efficiently this can be done. Nascimento and Winter [30] proposed the notion of OT capacity, which is the optimal rate at which noisy channels can be employed to realize OT, and also determined which noise resources have strictly positive OT capacity. Imai et al. [25] obtained the OT capacity of erasures channels against passive adversaries (i.e., adversaries which always follow the protocol) and a lower bound on its OT capacity against malicious adversaries (which can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol). Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] , [2] showed new bounds for the OT capacity of erasure channels. 1 
B. Generalized Erasure Channel
A generalized erasure channel (GEC) is a combination of a discrete memoryless channel and an erasure channel. Independently from the input symbol of each transmission, the output is an erasure with probability p * > 0. GECs represent a very special case for the study of OT based on noisy channels. In fact, most known techniques to implement OT from noisy channels first use the noisy channel to emulate a GEC (in case that it is not already one) and then use the (emulated) GEC in the rest of the protocol. Thus, clarifying the OT capacity of the generalized erasure channels is a central question in noisebased cryptography.
Ahlswede and Csiszár [1] , [2] investigated the OT capacity of GECs against passive adversaries. For a GEC with p * ≥ 1/2, they determined the OT capacity. For a GEC with p * < 1/2, they obtained upper and lower bounds for the OT capacity. Of course, the upper bounds also hold for the case of malicious adversaries. Pinto et al. [33] proved that for a GEC with p * ≥ 1/2, the OT rate achieved by Ahlswede and Csiszár's protocol against passive adversaries can also be achieved against malicious adversaries, and so the OT capacity is the same. The techniques used in [33] were first presented by Crépeau and Savvides in [14] and clearly do not apply in the case p * < 1/2 as they explicitly use the fact that the majority of the symbols received by Alice are erasures.
C. Our Contribution
In this work we prove that for a GEC with p * < 1/2, the same OT rate achieved by Ahlswede and Csiszár's protocol [1] , [2] in the case of passive adversaries can also be achieved in the case of malicious adversaries, thus establishing a lower bound on the OT capacity of these GECs against malicious participants that is equal to one obtained against passive ones. Our new protocol is based on a novel association of interactive hashing and typicality tests that basically forces the receiver of the OT protocol to discard a fraction of the symbols that were not erased thus going back to the standard situation of a rough equality of the remaining good symbols and erasures. We provide security definitions and a full security proof for our protocol.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
Domains of random variables and other sets will be denoted by calligraphic letters, the cardinality of a set X by |X |, random variables by upper case letters, and realizations of the random variables by lower case letters. For a random variable X over X , P X : X → [0, 1] with x∈X P X (x) = 1 denotes its probability distribution. For a joint probability distribution
denotes the marginal probability distribution and P X |Y (x|y) := P XY (x,y) P Y (y) the conditional probability distribution if P Y (y) = 0. X ∈ R X denotes a random variable uniformly distributed over X and U r a vector uniformly chosen from {0, 1} r .
[n] denotes the set {1, ..., n} and 
B. Entropy and Extractors
The main entropy measure used in this work is the minentropy since its conditional version captures the notion of unpredictability of a random variable, i.e., the private randomness that can be extracted from variable X given the correlated random variable Y possessed by an adversary. For a finite alphabet X , the min-entropy of a random variable X ∈ X is defined as
Its conditional version, for a finite alphabet Y and a random variable Y ∈ Y, is defined as
For two probability distributions P X and P Y over the same domain V, the statistical distance between them is
In order to extract secure one-time pads from random variables we use strong extractors [20] , [21] , [31] .
Definition 1 (Strong Extractors): A probabilistic polynomial time function Ext : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} r → {0, 1} using r bits of randomness is a (n, m, , )−strong extractor if for all probability distributions P X with X = {0, 1} n and such that
In particular we will use Universal Hash Functions [7] as strong extractors since they can extract the optimal number of nearly random bits [35] according to the Leftover-Hash Lemma (similarly the Privacy-Amplification Lemma) [4] , [5] , [24] , [26] . 2 ) is at most |Y| −1 when g is chosen uniformly at random from G.
We will use the same statement of the Leftover-Hash Lemma as Dodis et al. [20] , which follows from the result of Håstad et al. [24] .
Lemma 1 [20] , [24] : Let G be a 2-universal class of functions g : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} . Then for G chosen uniformly at random from G we have that
In particular, it is a (n, m, , )−strong extractor when ≤ m − 2 log( −1 ) + 2.
C. Interactive Hashing and Encoding of Subsets
The oblivious transfer protocol introduced in this paper uses interactive hashing as an important building block. Interactive hashing is a cryptographic primitive between two players, the sender (Bob) and the receiver (Alice) which was initially introduced in the context of computationally secure cryptography [32] but was later on generalized for the context of information-theoretical cryptography. It is particularly useful in the design of unconditionally secure oblivious transfer protocols [6] , [14] , [18] , [19] , [22] , [33] . In this primitive Bob inputs a string W ∈ {0, 1} m and both Alice and Bob receive as output two strings W 0 , W 1 ∈ {0, 1} m such that W 0 = W 1 . The first requirement is that one of the two output strings, W d , should be equal to W . The second requirement is that one of the strings should be effectively beyond the control of (a malicious) Bob. On the other hand, the third requirement states that (a malicious) Alice should not be able to learn d (as long as W 0 and W 1 are a priori equally likely to be the input).
Definition 3 (Security of Interactive Hashing [18] , [19] If the distribution of the string Wd over the randomness of the two parties is η-close to uniform on all strings not equal to W d , then the protocol is called η-uniform interactive hashing.
Lemma 2 [18] , [19] 
: Let t, m be positive integers such that t ≥ log m +2. Then there exists a four-message (2 −m )-uniform (t, 2 −(m−t )+O(log m) )-secure interactive hashing protocol.
The interactive hashing scheme ensures that one of the outputs is almost uniformly random; however, in the oblivious transfer protocol, the two strings are not used directly, but as encodings of subsets. For the protocol to succeed, both output strings should be valid encodings of subsets. Cover showed [9] the existence of an efficiently computable one to one mapping F :
[n] → [ n ] for every integer ≤ n (thus making it possible to encode the set [n] in binary strings of length m = log n ). But using such mapping in a straightforward way may result in only slightly more than half of the strings being valid encodings. Therefore we use the modified encoding of Savvides [36] , in which each string W ∈ {0, 1} m encodes the same subset as W mod n , thus implying that all strings always encode valid subsets. In this encoding, each subset corresponds to either 1 or 2 strings in {0, 1} m , so this scheme can at most double the fraction of the strings that maps to Bob's subset of interest.
III. SECURITY MODEL
In this section we specify the model used for proving the security of the oblivious transfer protocol and also the resources available to the parties. In the one-out-of-two string oblivious transfer, Alice gives two strings S 0 , S 1 ∈ {0, 1} k as input and Bob inputs a choice bit c. Bob receives S c as output and remains ignorant about S c , while Alice should not learn Bob's choice bit. As showed by Beaver [3] , there exists a very efficient reduction from randomized OT to OT, therefore in this paper we consider for simplicity OT with random inputs. We consider malicious adversaries that can act arbitrarily. The protocol participants are connected by both a noiseless channel and a generalized erasure channel. The security parameter n determines the number of times that the generalized erasure channel can be used.
Definition 4 (Generalized Erasure Channel [1] , [2] ):
We use the OT security definition from Crépeau and Wullschleger [16] because it implies the sequential composability of the protocols that meet it. Their definition is described below. The statistical information of X and Y given Z is defined as
A F -hybrid protocol consists of a pair of algorithms P = (A, B) that can interact and have access to some functionality F . A pair of algorithms P = ( A, B) is admissible for protocol P if at least one of the parties is honest, that is, if at least one of the equalities A = A and B = B holds. Let S denote (S 0 , S 1 ).
Theorem 1 [16]: A protocol P securely realizes string OT (for k-bit strings) with an error of at most 6 if for every admissible pair of algorithms P = ( A, B) for protocol P and for all inputs (S, C), P produces outputs (U, V ) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
• (Correctness) If both parties are honest, then U = ⊥ and 
A. Intuition Behind Our Protocol
Before formally presenting our protocol and its proof of security, we provide an intuitive explanation of how it works and what are the main technical contributions behind it.
The basic principle behind our protocol goes back to the reduction from OT to Rabin OT, originally proposed by Crépeau in [10] . We ask the sender (Alice) to send a random string to the receiver (Bob). Bob then selects two tuples of positions (of the same length) such that one of them consists almost entirely of erasures. These two tuples of positions are announced to Alice. Later on in the protocol, Alice uses the values associated with each one of these tuples of positions to compute encryption keys. These keys are used to encrypt the two strings to be obliviously transmitted to Bob. Since one of the tuples of positions consists entirely of erasures, Bob won't be able to decrypt the string associated with it. Security against Alice comes from the fact that she does not know which tuple corresponds to erasures and which tuple does not.
This idea works fine for honest-but-curious players. However, it does not deal with the case of malicious players. Particularly, nothing prevents a malicious Bob from distributing erasures and non-erasures over the two tuples of positions. The main function of interactive hashing in informationtheoretically secure OT protocols based on noisy channels is to enforce that the OT receiver (Bob) actually selects one of the two tuples of positions consisting almost entirely of erasures. If the erasure probability of the channel is high (i.e., bigger than 1 2 ), this can be guaranteed by making Bob use tuples with length almost equal to the expected number of non-erasures and forcing him to use almost only nonerasures (good positions) in one of the tuples, which directly implies that the other one will correspond almost entirely of erasures. One can then use interactive hashing to force Bob to put almost all good positions in one tuple; as proposed by Crépeau and Savvides in [14] . In more details, Alice and Bob use the interactive hashing protocol for choosing one subset of each tuple. Bob's input to the interactive hashing protocol corresponds to the subset of good positions in the tuple with mostly erasures. The other subset would then be out of Bob's control due to the interactive hashing security properties. For the positions in the two subsets, Bob opens the outputs that he got from the channel and Alice performs typicality tests to check if Bob cheated. The positions used for the typicality test are discarded. The reason why this procedure forces Bob to put almost all good positions in a single tuple is that if he distributes too many good positions (non-erasures) in both tuples, then he would need to use a considerable amount of bad positions in both tuples and this would get caught by Alice with overwhelming probability during the typicality test since one of the subsets is out of Bob's control. By using these techniques, one can actually compute the OT capacity of generalized erasure channels for the case where p * ≥ 1/2 as proved in [33] .
In the case of noisy channels with low erasure probability (i.e., smaller than 1 2 ), this strategy cannot be used to force one tuple to consist almost entirely of bad positions (erasures) because there are more good than bad positions. Therefore, we need a new procedure that makes Bob discard good positions and enforces that almost all remaining good positions are in the same tuple. Our key idea is as follows: Instead of proving that almost all good positions are in the same tuple, we prove that almost all bad positions are in the same tuple. In more details: (1) Alice sends a random string to Bob as before; (2) In short, in this new usage of interactive hashing for OT protocols, we force Bob to discard many of his good positions in such a way that in one of tuples the remaining positions will be almost all bad. Naturally, a new proof of security has to be provided to back this intuition.
B. Protocol
We now present our protocol.
Protocol 1:
1) (Parameter Setting) Alice and Bob select a positive constant α such that 3α < 1/2 − p * and set β = 1/2 − p * − α. Note that β > 2α. 2) (GEC Usage) Alice chooses x n randomly according to the probability distribution that achieves the Shannon capacity of W 0 . She sends x n to Bob using the GEC, who receives the string y n . βn . He decodes w into a subset T of cardinality βn out of n/2 (using the encoding scheme described in Section II). Then he partitions the n positions into two sets of same cardinality. For R c he picks randomly, and without repetition, n/2 positions from G. 
Theorem 5: This string oblivious transfer protocol is secure.
Proof: a) Correctness: If both Alice and Bob are honest, Bob will get the correct output value unless he aborts in the Good/Bad Sets step or if the he does not recover exactly x Q c = x Q c in the Output step. But the probability that Bob has to abort in the Good/Bad Sets step is a negligible function of the security parameter n due to the the Chernoff bound [8] . Bob does not recover the correct x Q c = x Q c if either x Q c is not jointly typical with y Q c or if there exists another x Q c that has g c (x Q c ) = g c (x Q c ) and is jointly typical with y Q c . The former case only occurs with negligible probability due to the definition of joint typicality. For the latter case, an upper bound on the number of x Q c that are jointly typical with y Q c is 2 μn[H (X |Y ∈Y 0 )+ ] , for 0 < < and n sufficiently large. Therefore according to the LeftoverHash Lemma, for n sufficiently large, with overwhelming probability g c (x Q c ) = g c (x Q c ) for all these other x Q c that are jointly typical with y Q c . As all events that can result in Bob not obtaining the correct output only occur with negligible probability in n, the protocol is correct.
b) Security for Bob: In a generalized erasure channel, each input symbol x is erased with the same probability p * . Hence Alice has no knowledge about the erasures and thus from Alice's point of view the sets (R 0 , R 1 ) are independent from the choice bit c. The only other point where the bit c is used is to compute a = d ⊕ c in the Checking the Partitioning step. The interactive hashing protocol is η < 2 −m uniform, which is negligible since m = log n/2 βn = O(n) by applying Stirling's approximation. Thus with overwhelming probability wd is uniform in {0, 1} m \w, and so Alice's views are identical for d = 0 and d = 1. Hence she gains no information about d and therefore about c. Note that in the Output step Bob does not abort, so Alice cannot use reaction attacks. Therefore with overwhelming probability Alice's view of the protocol is independent from c. c) Security for Alice: The proof of security for Alice follows the lines of Savvides' proof [36, Sec. 5.1], but we use new variants of the supporting definitions and lemmas due to the fact that we use the interactive hashing protocol in a different way.
Definition 5: Let u(R) be the number of positions contained in R such that the corresponding output at this position was an erasure.
The proof is divided in two cases as follows: (i) both
Case 1: For proving Alice's security in the first case we will need the following lemmas.
Lemma 3: Let R be a set of cardinality n/2 such that u(R) ≥ 2αn. The fraction f of subsets T ⊂ R of cardinality βn that are good for R satisfies f < (1 − 2α) αn .
Proof: We prove that a subset T chosen uniformly at random will be good for R with probability smaller than (1 − 2α) αn using the probabilistic method. One way of choosing T is by picking sequentially at random, and without replacement, βn positions out of the n/2 positions in R. For 1 < i < βn, the probability p i that the i -th chosen position is a non-erasure given that the subset T does not have enough erasure positions so far to be considered bad for R (i.e., less than αn erasures) is upper bounded by
Since for a subset T to be considered good for R it needs to have at least βn − αn non-erasure positions, we have that
Lemma 4: Let R 0 , R 1 be sets of cardinality n/2 such that u(R 0 ) ≥ 2αn and u(R 1 ) ≥ 2αn. The fraction of strings w that decode to subsets T that are good for either R 0 or R 1 is no larger than 4(1 − 2α) αn .
Proof: It follows from the previous lemma and the union bound that the fraction f of subsets T that are good for either R 0 or R 1 is smaller than 2(1−2α) αn . Then the lemma follows straightforwardly from the fact that in the encoding scheme there are either one or two strings mapping to each set.
Since the fraction of the strings w ∈ {0, 1} m that are good for either R 0 or R 1 is no larger than 4(1 − 2α) αn , we can set the security parameter s of the interactive hashing protocol to log (4(1 −2α) αn 2 m ) = m +αn log (1 −2α)+2 and thus have ρ = 2 −(m−s)+O(log m) = 2 αn log (1−2α)+O(log n) . Hence, by the security of the interactive hashing protocol, the probability that both w 0 and w 1 are good for either R 0 or R 1 is a negligible function of n, and so with overwhelming probability one of the sets (w.l.o.g. R 0 ) will have u(R 
, which is a negligible function of n. Since Bob can only cheat with negligible probability in the case that both u(R 0 ), u(R 1 ) ≥ 2αn, the protocol is secure for Alice in this case.
Case 2: We assume w.l.o.g. that R 0 is the one with u(R 0 ) < 2αn. The Chernoff bound guarantees that |B| > ( p * − α)n with overwhelming probability. If T a is bad for R 1 , then, by the same reasons as above, we have that Bob can only successfully pass the test performed by Alice in the Checking the Partitioning step (i.e., finding y R Ta  1 that is jointly typical with Alice's input) with negligible probability. 
C. Maximizing the Oblivious Transfer Rate
For n sufficiently large, α, and γ can be made arbitrarily small without compromising the security, thus in the limit the strings' length can be up to np * 
Since the probability distribution used for X is the one achieving the Shannon capacity of W 0 , this is equal to np * C(W 0 ), thus proving Theorem 4.
V. CONCLUSIONS In this work it was proven that the known lower bound in case of passive adversaries for the oblivious transfer capacity of the generalized erasure channels with error probability p * < 1/2 also holds in the case of malicious adversaries, which can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. In order to prove this result, a novel usage of the interactive hashing technique suitable for channels with low erasure probability was established, which can be of interest in other scenarios. The question of determining the exact oblivious transfer capacity of the generalized erasure channels with low erasure probability remains open, even for passive adversaries, and would be an interesting direction for future research given the pivotal role of these channels in the known constructions of oblivious transfer from noisy channels. Another interesting line of research would be developing new methodologies for obtaining oblivious transfer from noisy channels which circumvent the need of emulating a generalized erasure channel as a first step.
APPENDIX TYPICAL SEQUENCES
The following definitions follow largely the book of Csiszár and Körner [17] .
Definition 7: For a probability distribution P on X and > 0 the -typical sequences form the set
with the number N(x|x n ) denoting the number of symbols x in the string x n .
The type of x n is the probability distribution P x n (x) = We now prove the following lemma: Lemma 5 [33] : Let W : X → Y be a discrete memoryless channel and x n ∈ X n , y n ∈ Y n be the input and output strings of this channel. Let A be a random subset of [n] Proof: By hypothesis x n and y n are conditional -typical, so for every symbols x and y we have that N(x y|x n y n ) − n P x n (x)W (y|x) ≤ n, for a large enough n. Given the conditional -typical strings x n and y n , the probability of selecting one pair with the specific values x and y for the substrings x A and y A is N(xy|x n y n ) n . We have that 
